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By Martin Zwick July 19, 2009
Holism and Human History
metanexus.net/holism-and-human-history/
1. A story of ‘culture’
There is something within us … that demands we pursue the whole story of the whole
cosmos if we are to be whole persons, in order to know who we are, where we are
from, where we are going, and how we should live. 
 —Call for Papers, Metanexus 2009 Conference
We want and need the ‘whole story,’ but the whole story is difficult to tell. We can reduce the
magnitude of the task by taking a cue from the title of the meeting, namely “Cosmos, Nature,
Culture: A Transdisciplinary Conference.” The ‘whole story’ can be divided into three stories:
the story of the unfolding of the universe (‘cosmos’), the story of the evolution of life
(‘nature’), and the story of human history (‘culture’). This paper focuses on the third of these.
Of course, human history is rooted in nature which is a manifestation of cosmos on our
planet, but its story is also a ‘partial whole’ unto itself. Indeed, it may be that constructing this
story presents the greatest challenge. We have a draft of the story of the cosmos, though it is
far from complete, especially about the origins of the universe, and far from free of mystery,
for example about dark matter and dark energy; and future discoveries are certain to surprise
us. A similar situation exists for our story of nature. Here too we are ignorant about origins,
i.e., how life began, and there are gaps in our knowledge of evolution and its mechanisms.
Still, adequate stories of cosmos and nature are available in rough form. By contrast, we do
not have even a preliminary draft of a story of ‘culture,’ i.e., human history, that has the
degree of consensus that exists about our stories of cosmos and nature.
1.1 The challenge of universal history
Telling the story of cosmos is the job of physics. Telling the story of nature is the job of
biology (and the story that bridges nature and cosmos, geology). Telling the story of culture is
the job of history (with assistance from the social sciences and the humanities), but until
recently historians have been reluctant to try to tell such a story. They point to a distinction
between the ‘nomothetic’—the lawful—and the ‘ideographic’—the unique and contingent,
and argue that history belongs to the realm of the latter. Macro-histories and philosophies of
history, such as those of Hegel (1837), Marx (1859), Spengler (1926), and Toynbee (1946,
1957), have thus not been well regarded by most historians, who commonly hold that no
plausible account of the whole of human history is possible. Post-modernists also reject meta
narratives as oppressive and ‘hegemonic.’ In recent years however, attitudes in the field of
history have shifted, with the emergence of the sub-field of world history and with new
interest among historians in ‘big history’ (McNeil & McNeill 2003; Christian 2004). While this
shift may have been stimulated by the positive example of those telling stories of cosmos
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and nature, it is predominantly a response to our new sense of the unity of the planet. This
unity—the result of space exploration, globalization, the Internet, the environmental-
ecological crisis, and other factors—makes evident the need for a holistic account of the
human past. The issue is not merely of academic interest. To support a synchronic
understanding of current threats to the biosphere, we need a diachronic view that puts the
present danger in a historical context. Our understanding of the past exerts a powerful but
often unseen influence, and if universal history is impossible as science, it is still necessary
as myth. Perhaps attempts to construct a theoretical history amount to the making of myth in
scientific language; if so, we should construct as compelling a myth as we can.
There is actually no escape from macro theories of history and meta narratives. If we do not
have an explicit historical model, however flawed, we default to our private mental models
that are flawed more severely for being unexamined. For example, if one insists on the
irreducibly unique character of historical events, this in effect implies a particular historical
theory, namely one in which events are random or, what is close to this, the unpredictable
results of actions launched by a multitude of individual wills. But such a theory would explain
much less than theories that posit the operation of large scale social forces, whether material
or cultural. If theory is possible in sociology, political science, and anthropology, it is possible
also in history. A denial of this, taken to an extreme, would imply that historical events are
devoid of pattern. While the uniqueness of human history makes scientific treatment difficult,
the unique histories of cosmos and nature have not stymied the efforts of cosmologists and
biologists. Even singular events are lawful and can be investigated scientifically by studying
their underlying dynamics and their similarities to other phenomena. A theory of history need
not imply that history unfolds deterministically or that random or unique occurrences do not
play an important role, nor does it inherently disallow the possibility of the free will of
individuals.
To be sure, macro-historical theories are great simplifications, but all theories are
simplifications; whether or not a theory is an oversimplification depends on what it is called
upon to perform. A macro-historical theory is needed for us to have a sense of the whole of
human history, however coarse an approximation the theory may be. The objection that any
theory accommodates only a fraction of what is known is not a reason to dismiss it, just a
reason to augment it with other accounts. The blind men differ about the elephant, but they
each do grasp part of the truth, and these truths could be pooled. Moreover, a theory is less
to be judged by how many facts it explains than by its explanatory power relative to
alternative theories of comparable simplicity.
1.2 Systems theories as a resource
This paper offers a holistic account of human history that draws on systems ideas. These
ideas are widely used in sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science in
synchronic models of social systems, and von Bertalanffy (1979), one of the founders of the
systems field, believed that they could be relevant also to history. One might still ask: even if
one grants the feasibility of universal history, if works such as those of Marx and Toynbee are
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considered unsatisfactory by historians, how could a systems theorist hope to do better? But
this is not von Bertalanffy’s claim. What he thought possible was something more modest
than the construction of a full scale theory. He argued merely that the systems field could
offer the discipline of history new concepts, mathematical formalisms, and modeling
methodologies.
Many theories being investigated in the systems field are of potential interest to historians.
Some were developed within the systems community; many others having a transdisciplinary
character were ‘borrowed’ from specialized disciplines. For example, in both non-equilibrium
thermodynamics and generalized evolution, time is understood differently from the way it is
usually viewed in physics, where the time-reversibility of physical laws implies that the
directionality of time is illusory; in these theories, time is real and directional, as it is on the
human scale. In non-linear dynamics, chaotic systems are sensitive to initial conditions and
perturbations of state precisely because they are governed by dynamic law. In ‘frozen
accidents’ (Gell-Mann 1994), randomness and determinism, the contingent and the
necessary, both manifest. The ideographic and nomothetic are complementary, not
antagonistic.
This paper is based on previous work of the author, specifically a model of hierarchical order
applied to molecular biology and linguistics (Zwick 1978a) and a catastrophe-theoretic
interpretation of Hegelian and Marxian dialectics (Zwick 1978b). This earlier work and the
present paper draw on a variety of ideas from graph theory, nonlinear dynamics (chaos and
catastrophe theories), information theory, non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and other
theories, but space constraints prohibit a presentation here of technical explanations. The
model also draws on Bennett’s (1961, 1966) ‘systematics,’ a philosophical framework of
number and graph symbolism. Though it is based on mathematical ideas, the model is not
derived deductively. It is conceptual more than mathematical, and is heuristic and
speculative.
The model offers structures that are more complex than the lineal or cyclic patterns that are
typically explicit or implicit in historical explanation. (‘Lineal’ here means a sequence of
stages; ‘linear’ is more commonly used, but it is better to reserve this word for its meanings
of additivity and proportionality which define linear equations.)  If one examines macro-
historical theories like those of Marx or Toynbee, one finds that their skeletal structures are
fairly simple, much as according to Levi-Strauss the archetypes of myths are simple. This is
not a deficiency, since not all the details of an exposition need to be closely tied to its
structure. Indeed, the reduction of a sophisticated narrative to its structural features alone is
rightly disparaged as ‘vulgarization.’
But if a macro-historical theory is to give coherent form to historical knowledge, the skeletal
structure of the theory needs to be adequately complex. To take this analogy further: the
human body would not be well served by the skeletal structure of a primitive vertebrate or by
a bony structure without tendons, ligaments, etc. Yet historical theories that postulate a
sequence of lineal or cyclic stages are using very elementary conceptual forms. The charge
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of oversimplification often leveled at historical theories is really addressed to these
underlying structures, rather than the narrative expositions based on them, whose level of
detail is not so readily faulted.
The assertion that systems theories might provide more complex structures for historical
models does not imply that systems ideas per se are inherently complex. For example, the
world history study by McNeil and McNeil (2003) is organized around the structural idea of a
‘network.’ These authors describe human history in terms of an ever increasing web of
interactions that has gradually enlarged to encompass the whole globe. Networks are a main
theme of current complexity research, but the core idea of a network is fairly simple, and the
authors do not offer any elaborate analysis of network structures.
What is presented in the next section is a process model whose structure is complex. The
structure is presented in figures and explained in accompanying exposition, and hopefully
the verbal explanations alone will suffice for readers unaccustomed to abstract diagrams. In
Section 3, the model is applied to macro-history. The result is far from a ‘whole story’ of
culture, but might serve as a structure for one.
It is useful to be explicit about the assumptions of the model. Levels of complexity and
stages of development are taken to be not infinitely plastic. Only certain structures are stable
enough to be enduring parts of some external order. For example, whether an atom occupies
one or another energy level may be contingent on the process the atom is involved in, but
the spectrum of atomic energy levels is given a priori by physical law. The phenomenon of
convergent evolution, where the same adaptation is independently discovered by different
species, also demonstrates that in many contexts the archetypes of structure and function
are discrete and limited in number. The model also assumes that processes are governed by
both chance and necessity (Monod 1972), and that it is a mistake to overemphasize one or
the other. Possibilities are finite, sometimes even few. Chance and necessity are both
involved in selecting the actual from among them. History is a mix of the ideographic and
nomothetic, and is amenable to theory.
2. A systems process model
2.1 Hierarchical levels of complexity
The main ideas of the model are the following:
A process is governed by some ‘organizing principle’ (OP).
The OP crystallizes (‘concentrates’) in some system formation event
The process develops (‘expands’) in stages, as potential becomes actual.
Development is partially deterministic and partially stochastic (random).
It is shaped mainly by internal factors but subject also to external influences.
It is especially hindered at two points of difficulty (‘barriers’).
An early minor barrier limits the spontaneous increase of complexity.
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A final major barrier blocks a transition to a new and more complex OP.
Multiple processes can blend, and mitigate or exacerbate these difficulties.
In Figure 1 below, some of these ideas are visually displayed in terms of hierarchical levels
of complexity, with temporal development being only implicit. Later, in Figure 2, this scheme
is modified to more explicitly specify a temporal process. Figure 1(a) shows increase of
complexity ‘spatially’ (synchronically) in terms of levels of organization. Levels are not all
equal. Those in bold and with longer lines are special because they represent the
emergence of qualitatively distinct organizing principles. OP1 and OP2 might, for example,
be levels of atom and cell, respectively, with intermediate levels representing small and large
molecules and macromolecular aggregates. Reaching the level of cell requires integration
via a qualitatively new principle (OP2), as would going from a cell to a multi-cellular organism
(OP3). Replacing one organizing principle with another is a kind of ‘cyclicity,’ so in a sense
this model includes lineality and cyclicity.
Figure 1 . Complexity of structure
(a) Levels of complexity. Arbitrarily, only one level is shown below OP1 and above OP2, but
further levels exist. System formation events (OP1 and OP2) are distinguished from generic
stages. (b) Complexification as expansion and concentration. The region from OP1 up to but
not including OP2 is the domain of influence of OP1, although once OP2 is realized, it
extends its influence downward.
Levels of complexity are either actual or potential,
but what is potential and not yet actual is still real.
This is like the energy levels of an atom: a higher
energy level may or may not be occupied by a
particular atom, but the level exists as potential
even before any atom has this particular state.
Another example where potential can be said to
exist before it is instantiated is an ecological niche
that is not yet filled. These notions of actual and potential are close to Kauffman’s (1993)
conception of the ‘adjacent possible’ although what is potential need not in fact be adjacent
to what is actual.
Just as all levels of complexity are not equally salient, all increases in complexity are not
equally accessible. Two inter-level transitions are especially problematic. The major barrier,
encountered at the end of the process, reflects the difficulty of transformation to a
qualitatively different order. At this juncture, continued development needs an integration that
replaces the old organizing principle (OP1) with a new one (OP2). The minor barrier,
encountered much earlier, makes it difficult to reach higher levels in the OP1 domain by
spontaneous complexification. Often this is because of combinatorial complexity. While OP1
inherently can support complexity all the way up to but not including OP2, it is rare for
spontaneous processes to fully realize this potential. The model does not specify a particular
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number of levels between OP1 and the minor barrier or between OP1 and OP2; it asserts
merely that a major obstacle to reaching OP2 exists, and that bottom-up complexification
stalls well before the organizing potential of OP1 is exhausted.
Figure 1(b) above shows the organizing principles as vertices of double cones. A system is a
set of elements integrated by relations into a higher level element. In the figure, the
participation of elements in complex structures is the cone of expansion rooted in OP1, while
the integration of such structures into a higher level element is the cone of concentration
leading to OP2. Complexification is initiated with expansion and completed with
concentration. (An alternative perspective: a system forms by concentration and manifests in
expansion.) The set of levels from OP1 to OP2 is thus divided into two parts by the minor
barrier. For example, going from atom to cell, lower levels consist of small molecules ordered
by covalent bonds whose interactions are dictated by the laws of chemistry, while upper
levels consist of macromolecules which interact mostly via non-covalent bonds and are
specified by the genetic information of the cell. Analogously, going from cell to organism,
lower levels primarily involve inter-cellular interactions, while upper levels are specified by
programmed differentiation at the level of the organism (Zwick 1978a). In principle, every
level can be viewed as a ‘system’ and reaching the level as a ‘system formation’ event, but in
this paper only levels that correspond to vertices of the cones are associated with such
events.
2.2 Complexification as process
Figure 2(a) below rotates Figure 1(a) by 90° to convert a synchronic (‘spatial’) depiction to a
diachronic (‘temporal’) one. What before was a principle governing levels of structure is now
a principle governing process. The principle organizes the system formation event which—on
some time scale—is a temporal ‘singularity.’
Figure 2. Complexification as process
(a) Levels of complexity are here stages (short vertical lines) s2, s3, etc., reached over time,
minor (dotted) and major (dashed) barriers are also now vertical.
(b) Multiple processes having the same OP may reach different stages. The minor barrier
makes continued complexification difficult. Not shown are processes reaching later stages
and the difficulty of achieving OP2.
Note that the line in Figure 2(a) starts
earlier than the system formation event
(OP1). System formation is never ex nihilo.
Precursors always exist (in Figure 1(b)
precursors to OP2 are represented by the
cone of concentration leading to it). Figure
2(b) illustrates the fact that progress to
later stages of development (s2, s3, etc.)
is neither inevitable nor irreversible (the
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same is true for Figure 1): given several processes having the same OP1, some advance to
s2, some to s3, but only one—because of the minor barrier—is shown advancing to s4.
‘Time’ here means sequence, not chronology; it just orders events; two processes that reach
s2 do not necessarily reach it at the same moment. Figure 2(b) also shows that a process
can reverse itself and move toward earlier stages, or can branch into alternative paths of
development or differentiate into multiple paths. Several features of the model are not
represented in these figures. Contingency and external influence affect the process at all
stages but are especially critical at the two barriers. Stages also are not simply events which
sequentially follow and ‘replace’ one another; later stages may retain aspects of earlier ones
or be ‘layered over’ them. Also, a stage might impact not merely the next one but later stages
as well.
A potential for reaching OP2 is implicit in OP1, but whether this potential becomes actual,
whether OP1 is ‘completed’ and OP2 reached, is contingent and not determined. Expansion
does not always lead to successful concentration. When it does, OP2 may first be achieved
transiently, after which the full potential of OP1 can be realized and the new organizing
principle stabilized. Or there may be an internal innovation or supplementary process that
‘manages’ complexity and helps the primary process past the minor barrier. Such a
secondary process might come from differentiation within the system or might have an
external origin; it too will encounter its own points of difficulty. Figure 3 below depicts this
idea that a secondary process can assist the primary process through the minor barrier. The
occurrence of such a secondary process, like transitions from stage to stage in the primary
process, is contingent and not determined. Figure 3 below simplifies Figure 2(a) by omitting
the individual stages, drawing each process as a directed line (an arrow). The simplicity of a
line hides the complexity of what it summarizes; it does not mean stasis; it represents the
unfolding of a process in disequilibrium, an unfolding that is probabilistic and not necessarily
unidirectional. 
Figure 3 . A secondary process augmenting the first
This simplified representation omits stages and shows only system formation events and
major and minor barriers (dashed and dotted lines, now horizontal). The secondary process,
B, which differentiates from the primary one, A, is not shown here as requiring passage
through a major barrier, but this is provisional and requires further investigation.
In the figure, the secondary process is the
result of a differentiation. The two processes
are shown as separate for visual clarity but
they actually blend together. This is another
source of difficulty in diachronic development.
Processes are subject not only to (i) the contingencies of moving from stage to stage and (ii)
the barriers that pose special difficulties, but also to (iii) the tensions that accompany
differentiation and integration. The model assumes the existence of some disequilibrium that
generates the process, producing both its overall unfolding and stage-to-stage transitions.
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Disequilibrium might be described with non-equilibrium thermodynamics which governs
systems driven by a flux of matter-energy and whose dynamics are non-linear.  Such
systems have steady states defined by their dynamic law, but transitions from one state
(stage) to another may be triggered by unique and contingent factors (Prigogine 1980). The
overall unfolding and stage-to-stage transitions also lend themselves to a dialectical view of
process which can be modeled mathematically with catastrophe theory (Zwick 1978b); this
formalism can in addition model the idea that a secondary process can assist a primary
process through its minor barrier. Systems driven far from equilibrium by matter-energy flux
may spontaneously reach critical states where they are vulnerable to—or poised for—
significant singular events (Bak 1996); this ‘self-organized criticality’ might characterize
systems at barrier points. 
The next section applies this process model to human history. The result is a coarse schema,
a “crude look at the whole” (Gell-Mann 1994), in this case a historical whole. The model is a
‘filing system’ for organizing knowledge, but a complex filing system is an epistemology if not
an ontology, and the model may suggest some new insights.
3. Application to macro-history
3.1 A three process model
3.1.1 Periodization
The model is applied to macro-history by defining three processes, one of which is primary.
To introduce this application, it is useful to set out first what the stages of the primary process
might be; ‘might be’ because the model, as applied here to history, does not specify these
stages exactly, only the character of the processes and the nature of their barriers. Still a
provisional scheme of stages is useful for later discussion, so such a sequence of stages
(Stearns 2007) is set out in Figure 4 below. Two caveats need to be made about this
periodization: (1) the beginning and ending dates of the periods are approximate, partially
arbitrary, and provisional; (2) these dates are not what is really being modeled: as noted
above, the model specifies a sequence of stages, not a chronology—two societies might
reach the same stage at different times.
Figure 4. Periodization: stages of world history
(a) Stages of world history, whose beginnings are labeled S1 to s8; the time scale here is not
linear but more logarithmic: the earlier stages are much longer than later ones. 
(b) System formation events A, B, and C, hypothesized in the model (shown more fully below
in Figure 5). The processes launched at A, B, and C blend together.
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The period of biological emergence spans the first appearance of Homo sapiens sapiens
through the earliest hunter-gatherer societies until the Neolithic Revolution, the second
stage. The third stage covers the early civilizations that developed around the Tigris-
Euphrates, Nile, Indus, and Yellow Rivers. The fourth is the ‘classical’ period of urban
civilizations of Greece and Rome, Persia, China, and India. The fifth stage, the Post-
Classical period, begins with the fall of empires, e.g., of Rome, the Han dynasty, and Gupta
India. The sixth stage includes the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and the
origins of modern science. The seventh and eighth stages mark the modern era. A similar
sequence of stages is offered by Mumford (1956). Note that since the model does not itself
specify a particular number of stages between organizing principles and their barriers, the
arbitrariness that is inevitable in any periodization is not problematic.
3.1.2 Three processes
Figure 5 expands on Figure 4 and depicts history in terms of three processes. PI is the
primary process of societal development, including the dependence of human society on
nature. PII is the diachronics of culture; after B, it refers to the Axial religions and
philosophies (discussed below). PIII is the transition to modernity that happened first in the
West: secularism, humanism, and—quintessentially—the emergence of science and
technology. PIII links and mediates between PI and PII: science is part of culture, but
technology is part of the material order of society. A, the systems formation event of PI,
occurred at S1; B, this event for PII occurred within s4 (the Classical period), and C, this
event for PIII occurred within s6 (the Early Modern period). System formation events A, B,
and C and minor barriers 1 and 2 occurred in the past; shown in bold in the figure are event
D, minor barrier 3, and major barrier 4 which are occurring today. 
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Figure 5 . A macro-historical model: some linked processes of complexification
This figure, like Figure 3, uses a simplified representation where stages are not shown and
barriers (dotted and dashed) are horizontal. ‘Science,’ the label for PIII, is shorthand for a
more complicated notion. Point 5 and event E might occur in the future. The major barrier
and the possible completion of PIII and the blending of the processes shown earlier in Figure
4 are not depicted here.
The word ‘culture’ as applied to PII has a meaning narrower than its meaning in ‘cosmos,
nature, culture,’ spoken about in the first section. There the word refers to all aspects of
human life; here it means culture specifically (religion, science, arts and humanities), as
opposed to other aspects of human society. This is shown in Figure 6 in terms of Talcott
Parsons’ (1966, 1971) systems-theoretic view of social systems. 
Figure 6 . Parsons’ tetradic view of social systems
(a) Parsons’ tetrad of ‘action’ applied to social systems; (b) hierarchical information and
matter-energy flows; (c) relation of Parsons’ scheme to the processes in Figure 5.
PII is ‘higher than’ PI and is a source of information that flows downward, while matter-
energy flows upward, ultimately from nature, as shown in Figure 6(b). In Marxian terms, PI is
‘base’ and PII is ‘superstructure.’ PIII mediates: science per se, and the rest of culture, is part
of the superstructure, but science-based technology is part of the base.
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Materialist views of history, e.g., that of Marx, focus on PI and PIII; idealist views of history,
e.g., that of Hegel or Toynbee, focus on PII and PIII. From a systems perspective, materialist
views stress matter-energy and idealist views stress information; one purpose of this model
is to join together these two orientations. The three processes echo the philosophical triad of
God-World-Man of Rosenzweig (2005) (in Chinese thought, this triad is Heaven-Earth-Man):
PI is World-centered, PII is God-centered, and PIII is Man-centered. (‘World’ here means
nature, not global human society.) In terms of Bennett’s (1961, 1966) systematics, the triad of
system formation events shown in Figure 7(a) is ‘ascending’ or ‘evolutionary’: societal
development (A) ‘below’ receives the Axial dispensations (B) from ‘above,’ the interaction
resulting in and mediated by the transition to modernity (C). (Figure 7(b) is discussed below
in Section 3.2.2.)
Figure 7. Two triads of processes
(a) Triad of system formation events; (b) Triad of periods of expansion.
3.2 A view of the past
This section discusses the Axial and modern transformations, which bridged the minor
barriers of PI and PII, respectively. Section 3.2.1 Transformation in the Axial period
discusses system formation event B that occurred at minor barrier 1. Section 3.2.2
Transformation to modernity discusses system formation event C that occurred at minor
barrier 2. In Figure 5 the processes are vertically ordered in terms of the information vs.
matter-energy hierarchy (this is the basis of the triadic schemes of Figure 7); Figure 8
reorganizes this earlier figure and displays processes based instead on their order of
occurrence. 
Figure 8. Three processes in the past
System formation events A, B, C; minor barriers 1, 2
3.2.1 Transformation in the Axial period
In Figure 8, A is the primary initiating
event, the emergence of the human
species (its precursors are indicated by a),
and the formation of early societies. While
biological emergence happened only
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once, in Africa, human populations gradually dispersed over much of the planet, and
societies formed in many locations. B refers to events that by contrast occurred in only some
locations: in societies that encountered the dangers, disorders, and complexities of urban
civilization (point 1 in Figure 8), and where the religious or philosophical innovations of the
Axial period eased these difficulties and allowed continued development (Jaspers 1953,
Mumford 1956, Armstrong 2007). Urban civilization had alienated individuals from society
and presented threats and pressures on a large scale, but the new Axial definition of the
person mitigated these tensions and facilitated social integration. 
The ‘Axial period’ usually refers to cultural developments of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE,
exemplified in such figures as Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tzu, Zoroaster, the Hebrew
prophets, and the mystics of the Upanishads, developments that appeared in religious (e.g.,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Hebrew monotheism) and secular (e.g., Greek philosophy,
Confucianism) forms. In this paper these developments are taken to include not only
Christianity but also Islam, both of which emerged later but had roots in this period. While
most if not all human societies had religion-based culture—indicated in Figure 8 by the b that
precedes B—and while civilizations arose in all regions of the world, Axial breakthroughs
happened only in Eurasia. Mumford (1956), referring to the scientific work of Maxwell,
described these events as ‘singular points,’ rare historical moments at which extraordinary
individuals could have enormous societal impact. The Axial breakthroughs transformed
civilizations and radically altered human history. As Armstrong writes (2007):
“The Axial Age was one of the most seminal periods of intellectual, psychological,
philosophical, and religious change in recorded history; there would be nothing
comparable until the Great Western Transformation, which created our own scientific
and technological modernity.”
Even if a materialist account—Marxist, geographic, energy-based, environmental,
technological, or some mix of these—were sufficient to explain PI, it would still need to be
supplemented by a culture-centered (PII) account. Human history is co-determined by base
and superstructure; any reductionism, either downward to the base or upward to the
superstructure, is simplistic and inadequate.
The Axial religions made available new heights of human transcendence, but climbing
heights is not for the many, and even mountain climbers cannot live for long at the
mountaintop. In his extraordinarily rich yet compact story of ‘culture’ (the best such story the
author of this paper has encountered), Mumford describes ‘Old World Man’—corresponding
to the Post-Classical period—descending from Axial heights (The triangles of Figure 7 above
also serve the purpose of visually symbolizing this ascent and descent):
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“In following the series of transformations that lifted man out of his original animal self
and brought him to his present state, we have now climbed to a watershed and face
the other side. Looking back, one sees the long foreground of animal and primitive life,
the muddy bottoms of tribal culture, the cultivated foothills of the archaic communities,
the serried mountains of civilization, terraced part way up, finally the glacial ice fields of
the axial religions, at whose summits the blue sky darkens and the air becomes too
rarified to sustain life without undue strain on the lungs and heart. But on the reverse
slope the contours of the landscape become sharply different: in a few short steps
downward, one loses sight of the rugged heights man has been so strenuously
climbing: after a sudden drop one finds oneself on a plateau …”
The post-Classical period witnessed the flowering of the Axial traditions and their rapid
spread throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe. There were comparable advances in PI in the
proliferation of international trade. Recall that Figure 1(b) shows complexification as
beginning with expansion and shifting to concentration; in the Post-Classical period there
was such a turning point, when global interactions became more salient than local or
regional ones. This is depicted in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 . Emergence of a world system
Turning point in Post-Classical period (s5) when an international trade system began to be a
dynamic ‘attractor’ toward increasing unity. In the Early Modern period (s6), the Americas
were included and a true world system was constituted.
The Axial dispensations were events of differentiation. Although culture has always been an
inseparable part of society, PII had emerged as an independent current, often in opposition
to PI. But soon thereafter, the two currents reunited. Socrates was condemned by Athens,
but Stoicism was later a mainstay of Rome; Christians were a persecuted minority, but
Christianity became the religion of the empire. Islam briefly opposed the pre-existing order,
but Mohammed was also a political leader, so in Islam the connection between religion and
politics came early. The Axial traditions became intimately joined to the state in Christian,
Islamic, and Confucian societies. (Relative to these other traditions, Buddhism maintained a
greater distance from state and society.) For a time the union of PI and PII fostered the
creative development of these civilizations, but ultimately the traditions rigidified. The Axial
traditions encountered developmental difficulties (point 2 in Figure 8), such as disintegration,
rigidification, and external vulnerability. These difficulties manifested in Christian Europe, in
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the Islamic Middle East, in Confucian (and Taoist and Buddhist) China, and in Hindu India in
different ways and at different times, but societies integrated by religion-based culture
everywhere faced challenges to further progress.
3.2.2 Transformation to modernity
In one location, however, these difficulties were overcome by a third system formation event
(C in Figure 8, in the Early Modern period, s6)—the Renaissance, the Reformation, the
Enlightenment, and the Scientific Revolution—drawing on cultural traditions that had first
crystallized in the Classical period (s4). PIII is labeled ‘science’ for simplicity, but it is
intended to include all forces that promoted the priority of reason and experience over
authority and revelation. Armstrong calls this event the ‘Great Western Transformation’ and
compares it to the transformations effected by the Axial religions. Just as the stalling of
societal complexification (PI) was relieved by liberating influences of the Axial traditions (PII),
so too was the stalling of religion-based culture relieved—initially only in the West—by the
liberating influences of science and secular humanism (PIII). This liberation, however, did not
come without conflict. Though science emerged in a context of religion (Kepler was a mystic,
Newton was devout though heterodox, and natural religion was a mandate of the new
science), it eventually came into opposition to it. The authority of political and religious
hierarchies was challenged by the reason of independent individuals. The new hope of
humanism and secularism and exhaustion from the bloody religious wars led to the
dissolution of the union of religion and politics. The West, at great cost, had grasped the
important truth that the uniting of church and state accelerates the corruption of both. Just as
PII had differentiated from PI, PIII now differentiated from PII and PI and pried the two apart. 
Why the development of science and the breakthrough to modernity happened initially in the
West and not elsewhere has been the subject of much historical discussion. Science
depends on the synergy of inductive empiricism and deductive theory. The present model
shows inputs from PI and PII as prerequisites to science (in Figure 8, g and g′, interpretable
as empirically-based technology and potential for theory, respectively). Technology was
available not only in the West but also in China (Needham 1956) and other civilizations, so
perhaps it was potential for theory that was the critical factor. The possibility of theory may
have required a fusion of secular and religious traditions of suitable types. Only in the West
was such a fusion accomplished: Christianity, with its conception of a created and thus
explicitly lawful cosmos, was united with Greek philosophy, with its speculations about both
substance and form, its observation of nature, and its appreciation of mathematics. By
contrast, China’s secular Axial tradition, Confucianism, was society- rather than nature-
oriented, and its religious traditions—Taoism and Buddhism—did not conceive of cosmos as
governed by explicit law. Taoism was interested in nature, but the Tao was only implicit. “The
way that can be spoken is not the true way” did not inspire an articulation of natural law.
China’s ‘science’ was also very focused on form (Needham 1956)—in effect an early version
of systems theory without the necessary foundation in mathematics and substance-oriented
science. In Islam law was explicit, but interaction with Greek philosophy was transient and an
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enduring synthesis of religious and secular traditions was not fashioned. Science might have
arisen in India, though it lacked a secular Axial tradition, since its religious thought was
philosophical and its research into inner experience both empirical and theoretical, but there
may not have been sufficient focus on nature or adequate technological support.
PIII had profound effects on PI and PII. The transformation to modernity promoted the
development of the West and its world dominance during the last few hundred years. While
forms of science and technology occur in all societies, it was in the West that science first
crystallized as an autonomous aspect of culture and an inexhaustible source of technology.
Interactions between societies became more extensive as the human web spread from Afro-
Eurasia to cover the entire planet (McNeil & McNeill 2003). As modernity took hold, a ‘world
system’ (Wallerstein 1974) formed, and global factors gained ever greater significance. The
material life of societies was transformed by the utilization of fossil fuels. The increased flow
of energy through Western societies allowed them to achieve unparalleled heights of wealth.
After a successful beginning but before encountering its minor barrier, a process often enjoys
a period of vigorous expansion. For PI this was the Agricultural Revolution, for PII the
development and spread of the great religious traditions (in the Post-Classical period); for
PIII it was the Industrial Revolution (in the Long 19th century). This is depicted in Figure 7(b)
above.
Every expansion eventually encounters limitation. Modernity did not turn out to be the
advance it first seemed to be, even for those mostly enjoying its benefits. Today modernity
has reached its minor barrier and, simultaneous with this and linked to it, societal
development faces its major barrier. Difficulties of PIII and PI are exacerbated by tensions
involving PII. These crises of the present historical moment are discussed in the next
section.
3.3 A view of the present
Figure 10, like Figure 8, shows the processes displayed based on their time of occurrence,
and labels only the barriers of the present. Section 3.3.1—Crises of society and of modernity
—discusses minor barrier 3, major barrier 4, and possible system formation event D. 
Section 3.3.2—Crises involving religion—discusses the additional difficulties involving PII at
these two critical junctures.
Figure 10.  Three processes in the present
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3.3.1 Crises of society and of modernity
In societies that experienced the transformation to modernity, class divisions intensified,
though in response to the challenge of Marxism these divisions were to some extent
mitigated. Societies that did not accomplish this transformation lagged behind and were
exploited by the industrialized and militarily powerful West. In some locations in Asia and
South America, the West-East and North-South disparities of development have since
lessened, but the distortions caused by the Western origin of modernity are not fully rectified.
Literary theory imagines us living in post-modern times, but economy, polity, and community
in much of the world is pre-modern. Whether this is due to persisting effects of past
imperialism and colonialism or to internal socio-political or cultural factors, democracy and
economic development have not been achieved everywhere.
Modernity is not merely flawed by inequality. Because of technology, it now faces a crisis that
is acute and fundamental, and not just societal but biospheric. Development driven by fossil
fuel-based industrialization is destructive of the environment. Climate change is a planetary
danger second in potential harm only to global nuclear war, and though the threat of nuclear
war has receded it has far from vanished. Massive species extinctions are occurring, and
planetary ecosystems are everywhere being degraded. Economies need to shift from
exponential expansion to sustainable steady states, but this radical change in organizing
principle faces powerful opposition. The complexity, momentum, and negative externalities of
technology appear uncontrollable.
People have always thought that they lived at a special time in history, so claims to this effect
must be greeted with skepticism. These claims are also denied by the temporal version of
the “Copernican Principle” (Gott 1993)—the idea that no point in time is privileged, just as
Copernicus argued that the Earth is not a privileged point in space. Skepticism and memory
of Ptolemaic hubris notwithstanding, we are in fact living at a singular moment in human
history (Boulding 1965). Human societies expanded from a single origin and are converging
toward a new unity (A and D respectively in Figure 10; such expansion and concentration is
shown in Figure 1). Matter-energy globalization in PI is moreover potentiated by information
globalization in PIII. We now face the major barrier of the primary historical process (point 4
in Figure 10), which needs to be bridged by a system formation event. If reached, D would
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echo A at a higher level. This is depicted in Figure 11: in A, the human species emerged
biologically; in the completion and new beginning of D, the biological aspects of PI would
again be salient, but on a global rather than local scale.
  Figure 11 . Biological beginnings
We might ask about the planetary transformation that is underway: what is it like, what other
transformation does it resemble? A possible answer is that it is like the origin of life: the
integration of many molecular components into the coherent unity of a living cell. Such an
event is taking place in the present historical moment: a multitude of separate societies have
the need for and the possibility of being integrated into a coherent unity. Perhaps systems
formation of an organism is a better metaphor than of a cell. But metaphors are never exact.
Gaia already exists at a foundational level; humanity needs to cease undermining it and
begin completing it.
We have no story that adequately situates this challenge in the full sweep of human history.
Marxism, a materialist account of PI, offers some understanding, but Marxism too was
seduced by the fantasy of unlimited development through industrialization. Even beyond its
dismissal of religion (PII), its scientism and its cynicism about the liberal legacy of the
Enlightenment (PIII), it took nature for granted as a mere factor of production. Marxism was
not only wrong in its materialist reductionism, it didn’t take reductionism far enough. In terms
of Parsons’ model (Figure 6), it saw the economy as the material foundation for society. But it
is nature that is the matter-energy basis for society, and economies are subsystems of the
biosphere, not the reverse. Changes in the forces and relations of production and the
struggle of classes have indeed been a constant—and perhaps a dominant —feature in PI,
and Marxism was valuable as a critique of Capitalism, but its dream of an end to history was
a premature anticipation (Whyte 1948) of the planetary transformation that is now underway.
The horrors of the 20th century revealed the dark side of modernity; this is tersely expressed
by the year taken as the start of the Contemporary period: 1914. War, a constant of human
history, has had its destructive power greatly amplified by technology. The senseless
slaughter of WWI was followed by the devastation of WWII and the evils of totalitarianism.
Science was distorted for ideological ends by both Nazism and Communism, both of which
functioned as substitutions for religion; a third ideology, Capitalism, also supported by
inadequate science and inappropriate faith, has yet to evolve into a stable and rational form.
Today, modernity is challenged and optimism in reason is a thing of the past. While a secular
and humanist culture has flourished, with the undermining of religion, the coherence of
Western culture was lost. Other cultures that didn’t immediately feel the impact of PIII
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escaped for a while the trauma of incoherence, but this escape was only temporary, as the
influence of the West spread across the planet. Modernization is differentiation, and
differentiation produces attempts at re-integration, hence the resurgence of religious
fundamentalism in both politics and culture. Science itself is challenged by its own
complexity, having become fragmented and overspecialized, and the limits of scientific
understanding increase the technological risks that we face.
3.3.2 Crises involving religion
While PI and PIII face major and minor barriers, respectively, PII is not today at a critical
juncture. The difficulties that it presents arise from its own multiplicity and from its relations
with the other processes.
Religions are far from the stage at which they might be integrated or at which they could
make a positive contribution to the socio-technical (PI) and informational (PIII) knitting
together of the planet, so this unification must occur despite tensions between civilizations
based on different Axial traditions (Huntington 1997). The deepest of these tensions stem
from reactions to Western dominance, and the strongest of these reactions comes from
radical elements within Islam, an Axial tradition which awaits its own equivalent of
Reformation and Enlightenment. More generally, what is needed to lessen inter-civilizational
tensions is acceptance by the Axial traditions of religious pluralism. PII was originally
regional. Despite claims to the contrary, no tradition is truly universal; all are partially unique.
Moreover, value inheres in both universality and uniqueness, not in the former alone; and
from the value of uniqueness follows the imperative of diversity.
The conflict between religion and science (the tensions between PII and PIII) that began at
the onset of modernity continues today. While efforts of reconciliation help reduce these
tensions and raise the possibility of a new cultural coherence, this struggle remains
necessary to purify religion and correct the distortions of narrowly interpreted science. Belief-
based Western religion is in greater need of this confrontation than experientially-based
Eastern religion. Though the former gave birth to science, the latter seems more congenial to
it, since to the scientific mind experience trumps belief. There is another important tension
between PII and PIII. The Axial religions favored pneuma (spirit) over psyche (soul)—
mountain peaks to which we can ascend, as Mumford eloquently describes, over valleys
where we normally live (Hillman 1976).  With the coming of modernity, immanence has
displaced transcendence, and secular psychology, dedicated to soul, has challenged the role
of religion. Although a dialog between religion and psychology has begun, a spiritual-
psychological teaching of wide appeal that embraces both pneuma and psyche has yet to
emerge.
The earlier Figure 5 includes a projected possibility of a second religious system formation
event (E), which might be reached after passage through a period of difficulties (point 5). E
would be to PII what D might be to PI. Reaching E would require more than religious
pluralism and reconciliation with science. It would require a synthesis of the spiritual cores of
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the principal world religions, a synthesis that separated the wheat of spiritual truths from the
chaff of dogma and superstition, that united the realms of peak and vale, and that forged a
substantial connection between spiritual practice and science.
Religion has a role to play in addressing the current environmental crisis, but the Axial
traditions will not occupy center stage. Those of humanity’s religions that were not precursors
to the Axial traditions, that were instead aligned with the hunter-gatherer (S1) and agricultural
(s2) phases of societal development, did not play major roles in most of human history, but
have new relevance as the world faces the biospheric crisis of PI. Indigenous religions with
their deep connections to the natural world remind us that nature is sacred and that personal
and local ecological knowledge is a human possibility.  Scorned by the builders of city-based
culture, this ancient current of religion may become a cornerstone of a biologically-oriented
culture of the future. This is schematically depicted in Figure 12.
Figure 12 . Indigenous religion and the contemporary ecological crisis
4. Summary
The virtues of the model developed in this paper are several. Formally, it is more complex
than the skeletal structures of many macro-historical theories. It includes both the lawful and
the contingent, and incorporates lineal, cyclic, dialectical, thermodynamic, and singularity-
oriented notions of time. Substantively, it integrates materialist and idealist views of human
history. It encompasses the Axial breakthrough and the ‘Great Western Transformation’ as
structural events in the model, and the Agricultural Revolution, the impact of the Axial
traditions, and the Industrial Revolution as corresponding phases of expansion in three
processes. It provides a framework for understanding the multiple crises of the present
historical moment, especially the current challenge of planetary system formation.
The model violates political norms by insisting on some ‘centrisms.’ Though it acknowledges
that all societies have forms of religion and science, it still asserts that while human societies
developed everywhere after the emergence of the human species, B happened in only some
regions, and C happened only in one. The salience given to B is Eurasian-centrism, and to C
is Euro-centrism, and perhaps both are logo-centrisms, but views that are ‘centric’ are not
necessarily incorrect, except politically, and centrism-phobia is a form of intellectual rigidity.
Those who deny the importance of the Axial dispensations in Eurasia or the transition to
modernity in Europe should come up with an alternative account that is plausible and
competitive.
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The model is of course not a story of human history. Stories are told by story tellers, not
systems theorists. But this paper offers a skeletal structure for such a story. If cast in terms of
systems ideas that are very general, such a story of ‘culture’ could link to our stories of
‘cosmos’ and ‘nature.’ The historical model proposed here could be elaborated in much
greater detail, but even in rudimentary form, it already has some implications about “who we
are, where we are from, where we are going, and how we should live.”
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